American soldiers in Vietnam War
The American military, unquestionably the most powerful military force on the planet, has now lost three of the last four wars they have engaged in since the Korean War: Vietnam (1964-73), Iraq (2003-11) and Afghanistan (2001 and continuing). The only war the U.S. and their allies emerged with a clear victory was the Persian Gulf War (1990-91).
What has gone so wrong that the Americans and their allies cannot win wars despite the huge sums of money spent on the military, the sophistication of their weapons and the almost constant training of the military forces? Not to exaggerate, this is the most serious question faced by the western military alliance, and the answer should have an impact on all aspects of military planning and public policy.
As trite as it sounds the answer harkens back to the old saying that, “Generals always fight the last war.” War has changed and yet the Americans and their allies, including Canada, are still preparing to fight conventional wars like the Second World War or the Korean War, not the wars of the last fifty years.
Anyone with even a casual understanding of weapons and warfare will know that there is not a military force in the world today that could defeat the U.S. in conventional warfare. Because of this, challengers have developed and refined a military strategy that has come to be called “asymmetrical warfare.” In such conflicts a well-armed and supplied military force is pitted against an enemy that is much weaker militarily. The war takes place on the home territory of the weaker force.
Vietnam is a classic example of an asymmetrical war. The Viet Cong were native to Vietnam, and the Americans occupied the country with a much superior military force. The American military was well armed and trained, but their troops did not speak the language or understand the local culture. Soon they were seen as an occupying army by local people. In the end victory did not go to the superior force, as would be expected in a conventional war, it went to the Viet Cong.
Asymmetrical warfare has a long history. During the American Revolutionary War a group of American militia, called Minute Men, defeated British troops at Lexington and Concord using these tactics. During the Napoleonic War the poorly armed Spanish citizens drove the French out of Spain. The term “guerrilla war” comes from the Spanish word meaning “little war.”
Since the Korean War there have been many such conflicts: the French in Vietnam and Algeria, the British in Malaya and Kenya, the Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, the Rhodesian Bush War, the South African apartheid regime against the ANC, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. In all of these wars the military of the developed countries had far greater firepower, better trained armies and in many cases more men in the field than their enemies, but ultimately they were either defeated, forced to withdraw, or change their policies to accommodate the enemy.
In asymmetrical wars the guerrillas, as they are often called, are organized into small groups of lightly armed, mobile fighters. They use their knowledge of the country and the support of the local people to ambush and attack their better armed and equipped enemy. Even a small number of attackers using modern, hand held weapons can inflict heavy casualties on the enemy within seconds, especially if the forces attacked are in the open and the guerrilla fighters are concealed. Large numbers of attackers in a battle are a disadvantage in today’s asymmetrical wars because they can be spotted and eliminated by air strikes.
The aim of the attackers is not to defeat the enemy in each battle. It is to inflict casualties, harass the enemy and reduce their morale and commitment to the war. In asymmetrical warfare it is essential that the guerrilla group keep the support of the local population. That allows the fighters to merge with the people, get supplies, rest, plan the next operation and then strike again. It is estimated that two percent of the population can win a war such as this, if they have the sympathy of the other ninety-eight percent of the population.
During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson spoke about the importance of winning the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people. He understood that if the Americans were to win the war they had to have the support of the local population. But the problem was that the Americans were seen as an occupying army, they never won the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese and they lost the war.
There are many problems fighting an asymmetrical war but perhaps the most difficult is simply identifying the enemy. In unconventional wars the guerilla forces wear the clothing of the civilian population, and it is virtually impossible for an invading force, who cannot even speak the local language, to distinguish between friend and foe. This makes it very frustrating for the troops of the occupying army, and they often lash out against those they perceive to be the enemy with increasing ferocity.
The occupiers sweep into villages terrifying the local people. Soldiers kick in the doors of houses, round up young men, interrogate leaders and arrest those they vaguely suspect of being disloyal. Fear and anger often lead soldiers to commit atrocities. All of this makes the population angry at the occupying army, which leads to an increase in the recruits of the insurgents. Over time the number and intensity of the insurgent attacks increases.
Since Vietnam military planners have learned the American public has shown a reluctance to support wars where there are high casualties of their troops. As a result the Pentagon entered into an expensive and complicated program of computerization of the battlefield that uses bombing raids, and recently, unmanned drone aircraft. This high tech warfare is designed to keep troops out of harm’s way, but it creates more problems than it solves.
There are computer failures and technical incompetence on the part of the people operating the equipment. Like the troops on the ground, technicians and even intelligence agents often find it impossible to differentiate between friend and foe. As a consequence non-combatants are killed. In Afghanistan weddings have been attacked by American fighter planes and children out collecting firewood have been killed by air strikes. Again, incidents such as this fuel the anger of the local population and swell the ranks of the insurgents.
Victory in an asymmetrical war comes not from winning battles; it is the result of attrition. The struggle continues until the leaders of the invading force realize that they cannot sustain the casualties and are losing the support of the people at home. Finally political leaders make the decision to withdraw. That happened in every asymmetrical war of the past and soon will be the case in Afghanistan. Victory is the reward of stubborn perseverance, and the ability to continue the struggle despite the casualties and hardships.
There have been attempts to develop counter strategies designed to win asymmetrical wars. The most recent was proposed by General Stanley McChrystal who for a short time was the Commander in Chief of American forces in Afghanistan. He argued that peace could be made with willing branches of the Taliban. As a second step he said the Afghan Army should take the lead in the war with the NATO troops playing a supporting role. That policy was adopted by the Obama administration, but those on the ground say that the Afghan Army will never be in the position to lead the fight.
The former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates felt the answer was to make American troops more culturally sensitive. He toured military establishments giving speeches about the need of the American military to learn foreign languages, and develop an extensive understanding of different cultures. In theory this seems to be an effective counter strategy, but it is almost impossible to achieve. The task of teaching thousands of American troops languages like Arabic, Farsi or Chinese would be daunting, but the real question is, would it make a difference? An invading army is seen as invaders no matter what language they speak.
The Americans and their allies have been unable to win asymmetrical wars not because of their weapons, equipment or training and certainly not because the young men sent into battle lack courage. Military and political leaders are asking the troops to do the impossible. The nature of these wars makes them unwinnable and the only answer is to avoid becoming involved in them in the first place.
The Obama administration seems to recognize this. In January of this year the President announced cuts to the military and said, “The long wars of the last decade are over.” What was also significant about the announcement was the reallocation of funds among different branches of the military. There will be a reduction in the U.S. Army while the air force and navy will be strengthened. All the indications are that the top political leaders and military planners in the Pentagon are determined to avoid asymmetrical wars in the future but plan to play the role of the world policeman with the overwhelming power of U.S. conventional and nuclear strike force.
If this is their strategy, American military power will become increasingly irrelevant. There is no country in the world today that is going to challenge the United States in a conventional or nuclear war, but if the Americans refuse to fight the small scale asymmetrical wars that are prevalent today, then where is their power? They are reduced to posturing alone because it will be only under extreme threat that they will be willing to use their military power.
Under this scenario Canada’s military strategy is even more irrelevant than the American. We are junior partners in the U.S. military alliance. The Canadian military is training troops to fight more wars like Afghanistan, wars the U.S. intend to avoid. Meanwhile the purchase of sixty-five F 35 fighter jets cannot defend our sovereignty or even be a useful weapon to patrol the long Canadian coastlines, and as recent conflicts have demonstrated, fighter jets are very poor weapons in asymmetrical wars.
We are closely allied to a fading world power, and it is time to readjust our military to meet that new reality. If we want to play a role in world affairs and use our military for a useful purpose, now is the time to return to U.N. peacekeeping.
